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This report contends that most military-manpower research that aims to estimate causal effects 
suffers from flaws that render the research invalid.  I discuss the objectives and ethics of 
research, and I give a low-math quick guide to the main pitfalls of research,  While I do not test 
the claim that most manpower research is flawed, I show that several relatively prominent 
examples of manpower research turns out to be invalid, using the pitfalls I describe.  This 
includes some of my own prior research.  I end with recommendations on how to improve the 
research process for the Department of Defense, which includes: requiring training of researchers 
(beyond what graduate school taught and which could have helped me avoid my research 
mistakes), having review panels assess a proposed study’s methods before funding is granted, 
reviewing incentives at research organizations to ensure they promote high-quality research, 




The views represented in this report represent my own and not necessarily those of the Naval 
Postgraduate School or any other organization.  





If the Department of Defense were to buy weapons systems from a company whose products 
frequently turned out to be ineffective and useless, DoD would eventually stop procuring 
products from that company.  Ideally, DoD would treat organizations that produce invalid 
research the same by no longer funding research from these organizations, or by working with 
these organization to improve the quality of the research.  But most such organizations 
conducting academically-oriented research for DoD are rarely (or never) judged for the validity 
of their research.  And it remains rare that any individual research study is assessed for its 
validity. 
 
This is a report on my assessment of the state of quantitative military manpower research.  I 
believe much of this research, particularly the research that aims to estimate causal effects, has 
been highly-flawed, with researchers not recognizing or not disclosing the potential problems in 
their research.  This means that much of this research has had questionable value.   
 
In this report, I first describe the general goal of quantitative research.  (I concentrate on research 
aiming to estimate causal effects, such as on policy matters, but I recognize that there could be 
other objectives of quantitative research—e.g., forecasting.)  I argue that what we want to see in 
others’ research is their best effort to estimate the true causal effect of some factor/policy on an 
outcome.  Instead, what we often see is researchers’ best efforts to achieve statistical significance 
or to make the results interesting, turning the research process into salesmanship rather than true 
policy analysis.  (I have witnessed this.)  I make the case that researchers could be more 
responsible with their research and conclusions. 
 
Next, I discuss some basic concepts of quantitative research.  This includes minimal-math 
explanations for the following:  
(1) What a regression does and what “holding factors constant” means and actually does. 
(2) Distinguishing between the two main problems that cause a research statistic (e.g., a 
coefficient estimate representing a causal effect) to be wrong.  These are:  
(a) imprecision, which is similar to a margin-of-error in a political poll; and  
(b) systematic biases, which is being off-target, most likely due to systematic alternative 
explanations for why two variables are related. 
(3) How results and statistical significance (in light of imprecision) are often mis-interpreted 
by researchers and mis-perceived by consumers of research. 
(4) How to scrutinize a study by recognizing the main pitfalls (biases) of regression analysis. 
 
The largest problem, in my view, is from systematic biases.  More formally, these are situations 
in which limitations of the data or model cause there to be alternative explanations for the main 
research finding on how two variables are related.  The ideal situation is that they are related (or 
not) just due to how the treatment variable affects the outcome.  But any other reasons 
(alternative to the causal-effect story) why the two variables are related or not could lead to a 
bias in the estimated causal effect.   
 
I then apply those concepts to scrutinize several military-manpower research studies (or sets of 
studies) from a few different major research organizations.  I make the argument that there is an 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3822664
3 
 
inverse relationship between the usefulness and the validity of a study; all of these studies except 
for the first one have very questionable validity.  These studies are: 
• Peer effects at the Air Force Academy (this study has high validity, but questionable 
actionable value). 
• One of my own studies on how having a skill-relevant shore tour affected the likelihood 
of 2nd-term Navy retention—this was an important component on the larger question 
from the late 1990s of whether military shore billets should be outsourced. 
• How hostile deployments affect the likelihood of reenlistment. 
• How military distance-learning affects academic outcomes, compared to resident 
learning. 
• The general literature on how Selective Reenlistment Bonuses affect retention. 
• The Dynamic Retention Model in a few applications. 
 
One of these studies that had highly-questionable validity actually was published in an academic 
journal, and so being published is not a solid indicator that the research is valid. 
 
Whereas I would normally not wish to critique others’ research so directly, these examples are 
necessary to make the case about the problems in military manpower research.  And, to be fair, I 
critique a few of my own studies.   
 
Given the lack of training in research for most DoD officials, the responsibility for researchers is 
to recognize any biases or shortcomings of an analysis, acknowledge those shortcomings, and 
make responsible conclusions.  Trying to convince readers or officials they are briefing that such 
biases are minimal when they are not or drawing strong conclusions on estimates from a study 
that had many unaddressable biases would be considered irresponsible.  From my assessment of 
these and other manpower studies, which I invite others to do the same, my conclusion is that 
manpower quantitative research that aims to estimate causal effects is rife with flawed and 
irresponsible research. 
 
One lesson that will come through from this report is that some research problems cannot be 
properly addressed, given data or modeling limitations.  With proper recognition of the inherent 
biases and with an improved filtering process, I imagine that the DoD could save tens of millions 
of dollars per year that are wasted on invalid research. Or, DoD could shift resources towards 
research that would have a better combination of usefulness and validity. 
 
To this end, I offer a set of recommendations on practices and processes that I believe could help 
improve the efficiency of DoD research, in terms of usefulness per dollar spent.  My 
recommendations are the following: 
1. Require proper training of anyone conducting research for DoD.  This should include 
training on recognizing pitfalls, making responsible conclusions, and the ethics of 
research.  Such training could have prevented me from making several research mistakes 
in my career.  (From the evidence provided in this report, it seems that graduate schools 
did not do their job.) 
2. Provide basic training for DoD sponsors responsible for funding research on knowing 
what they can and cannot expect from researchers and some basic concepts of 
quantitative research so they know the right questions to ask. 
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3. Change how proposed research gets approved and funded by using a review panel to 
ensure that a given study’s methods will produce valid and useful research before it is 
funded. 
4. Review incentives at organizations to ensure they promote high-quality research (vice 
other results that might work against that). 
5. Improve quality control at research organizations. 
6. Periodically review the quality of an organization’s research. 
 
 
I fully recognize that this report will cost me socially in the field.  And, if this report were to 
become widely disseminated, I expect that there would be resistance to my argument, as some 
may bring forth some research that is both useful and valid.  I hope that they do.  However, what 
is most important here is that major research organizations have used federal research funds to 
conduct and disseminate research that had no ultimate usefulness because of validity problems.  
And, there is much more highly-flawed research that I did not include here. 





In 2019, I had an Econometrics textbook published (by Routledge) that attempted to change the 
way regression analysis is taught (Arkes, 2019).  I made the argument that the high-level math is 
unnecessary, emphasis needs to be shifted towards the more common pitfalls and issues that 
could affect the validity of a study, those pitfalls need to be taught in a more understandable (less 
math-intensive) way, and there needs to be discussions on the ethics of research—e.g., how 
statistical significance is not the goal of research.   
 
I mention this book first to establish my credibility and authority to assess research.  Second, I 
want to note that the process of writing the book made me think more deeply about and better 
understand those pitfalls, when those pitfalls occur, and how to make responsible conclusions.  
These are concepts that I (and many others) had not learned well from the long-standing 
conventional approach.  After 23 years as an economist conducting military manpower (and 
other) research, I have many thoughts on the problems with manpower research and how the 
process can be improved.   
 
I spent the first 10 years of my career as a researcher for the Center for Naval Analyses and 
RAND Corporation, and I was an Economics Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School for the 
remainder of my career.  I have made mistakes in research along the way.  I have learned from 
them.  And, I have seen flaws in the process that work against the generation of honest and 
responsible research.  This report aims to highlight problems with the research and the processes 
and offers some recommendations, all given in hope of improving the field and making the 
funding of military manpower (and perhaps other) research more efficient, with my full 
recognition that this report comes with a huge social cost to myself. 
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If the Department of Defense were to buy weapons systems from a company whose products 
frequently turned out to be ineffective and useless, DoD would eventually stop procuring 
products from that company.  Ideally, DoD would treat organizations that produce invalid 
research the same by no longer funding research from these organizations, or by working with 
these organization to improve the quality of the research.  But most such organizations 
conducting academically-oriented research for DoD are rarely (or never) judged for the validity 
of their research.  And it remains rare that any individual research study is assessed for its 
validity. 
 
An article I had published a few years ago (Arkes, 2018) made the argument that research, from 
the prior 45 years, on how Selective Reenlistment Bonuses affect retention has all had biases that 
invalidated the research and that the researchers failed to recognize.  As I reflected more on other 
military-manpower quantitative research, partly from teaching a class on the topic, I have come 
to realize that it is not just that one issue that has suffered from validity issues.  It’s practically 
the whole field of military manpower, particularly for research that aims to estimate causal 
effects.   
 
This is not to say that there has not been any valid quantitative manpower research.  Some early 
research after the All-Volunteer-Force (AVF) began may indeed have been instrumental in 
understanding how to make the AVF work.  However, as I theorize to my students and as is 
supported by the articles we read in that class, there appears to be an inverse relationship 
between the validity and the usefulness of a study.  That is, the studies that have more usefulness 
to the military tend to be less valid or less credible; and, the studies that are more valid (e.g., 
based on random assignment) tend to be on topics of less value to the military.  Sims (2010) 
noted a similar pattern in the whole field of Economics.   
 
Having valid and useful studies is important, given the amount of money that is spent on 
manpower research each year.  I am guessing that it is at least $75 million and perhaps much 
higher. 
 
One of my students, in a course-summary paper, drew upon a quote from Peter Parker’s 
(Spiderman’s) uncle: “With great power comes great responsibility.”  What he meant is that the 
ability to conduct statistical analysis gives someone great power, given that most people will 
accept what the results say without much scrutinization.  Those who have only a basic 
understanding of statistical methods believe that a regression is a “magic box” that produces the 
truth on some important issue.  But, that is far from the reality of regression analysis.  And so the 
responsibility for researchers is to recognize any biases or shortcomings of an analysis, 
acknowledge those shortcomings, and make responsible conclusions.  Trying to convince readers 
that such biases are minimal when they are not, or drawing strong conclusions on estimates from 
a study that had many unaddressable biases would be considered irresponsible.   
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This problem of flawed research is partially fixable.  We need to recognize that there are some 
things that just cannot be estimated.  It might be a data limitation, or it could be that the 
treatment factor that we hope to estimate the causal effect of is naturally non-random. 
 
There could be better quality filters when distributing research funds to make sure that the 
research design of a proposed project would likely be valid.  Organizations should have better 
quality control.  And there is more that can be done, as I describe below. 
 
With proper recognition of the inherent biases and with some filtering process, I imagine that the 
DoD could save tens of millions of dollars per year that are wasted on invalid research. Or, DoD 
could shift resources towards research that would have a better combination of usefulness and 
validity. 
 
In this report, I will discuss the goals of research, the basics of regression analysis, how to 
quickly assess a study for validity, some examples of prior studies (including one of my own) 
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2. THE GENERAL GOAL OF RESEARCH (IT’S NOT STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE) 
 
While some manpower research attempts to forecast certain outcomes (such as attrition), most 
research has the objective of estimating causal effects, or how one factor affects some outcome. 
This is often a policy analysis, such as how bonuses affect retention, or how a recruiting goal 
affects the productivity of a recruiter.  There are three general steps of the research process: 
 
A. Examining how some factor (a treatment) is related to an outcome, often after controlling 
for (or attempting to adjust for) other factors.  That is when the treatment is applied (or 
has a higher value), does the outcome tend to be lower, the same, or higher?  How 
precisely estimated is that relationship? 
B. Gauge how well you can rule out explanations for how the treatment and outcome are 
related (or not), alternative to the treatment having a causal impact on the outcome. 
C. Making responsible conclusions given the strength of the evidence (what you found, how 
precise it is, and how well you can rule out alternative explanations). 
 
One thing that DoD officials will notice is that almost all research that is presented to them will 
have statistically-significant results.  There is the possibility that some of this is the product of 
what is known as p-hacking: that researchers sometimes finagle models until the results show 
something interesting and significant.  (This could help in securing follow-up research funding, 
as sponsors might naturally tend to be more pleased with researchers who find interesting results, 
and it could help get publications, which researchers are judged on).  Yes, I have witnessed p-
hacking among colleagues. 
 
And so what operationally occurs is that statistical significance becomes the goal of research.  
But it shouldn’t be.  The goal should be the best model possible to minimize any potential biases.  
That is, what we hope to see in others’ research should be their honest attempt to produce the 
best model possible, not their best efforts to achieve statistical significance.  Unfortunately, the 
pursuit of significance has turned researchers more into sales-persons than academics. 
 
As a side note, this lesson that “significance is not the goal of research” has been new to my 
students, who had already taken two quarters of econometrics.  This is representative of how 
econometrics is generally taught: that it is a good thing to find significance. 
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3. THE BASICS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND ITS TWO MAIN 
PROBLEMS  
 
Basics of regression analysis 
 
As a reference framework, let us consider a regression model of how the Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) level affects the likelihood of a sailor reenlisting: 
 
𝑅𝑅 =  𝛽𝛽1 ∗ (𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ (𝑋𝑋) + 𝜀𝜀     (1) 
 
where 
• R = the reenlistment decision of a sailor (=1 if yes, =0 if no) 
• SRB = Selective Reenlistment Bonus (a level from 0 to 8) 
[The dollar amount of a bonus would be SRB*(monthly basic pay)*(# years reenlisting 
for).] 
• X = a generic set of other important factors 
• ε = the error term, as the model will not perfectly explain the outcome. 
 
In this model, we want to know how a higher SRB affects the likelihood that a service person 
would reenlist.  That is, on average, when the SRB is increased by one level, how much higher or 
lower would the likelihood that someone reenlists be? 
 
In most circumstances, we can separate the explanatory variables (on the right-hand-side of the 
equation) into two categories: 
• Treatment variable(s): ones you wish to estimate the causal effect of.  (It would be SRB 
in this case.) 
• Control variables: variables you include to help in your efforts to accurately estimate the 
effects of the treatment variable(s) on the outcome.  (This would be the variables in X.) 
 
What the regression tells us is not necessarily the causal effect of the SRB on the reenlistment 
decision (after controlling for the variables in X), but rather how the SRB and reenlistment 
propensity move together.  
 
Ideally, SRB would be assigned randomly so that the only reason why the SRB and reenlistment 
decision were related would be from the effects of the SRB.  But unfortunately, they might move 
together because the reenlistment propensity affects the SRB, or they have common factors.  For 
example, the Great Recession of 2009 led to very high unemployment rates, which caused a 
large increase in the propensity of service persons to reenlist, which allowed the services to 
generally reduce the SRBs.  This caused SRBs and reenlistment rates to move together 
negatively, and that negative contribution would be captured in the coefficient estimate on SRB 
if not properly addressed. 
 
As researchers, we want to design a model so that the SRB would change without other factors 
of reenlistment changing at the same time.  That is, we want to “hold all other relevant factors 
constant” as the available SRB varies in the sample. 
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A helpful analogy I have used before (Arkes, 2019) is based on testing whether adding cinnamon 
to your chocolate-chip cookies makes them taste better.  You would want to make two batches, 
and you would want to make sure that all other ingredients that could affect the taste are in the 
same proportions.  That is, you would want to “hold constant” the amount of sugar, butter, and 
chocolate chips.  This would make it so the only factor that changes from one batch to the other 
is whether cinnamon was added. 
 
In the SRB case, we want to design the model so that the SRB changes by itself (among the 
factors that could affect the retention decision).  Here lies the problem.  How do we design the 
model so that all other relevant factors that affect retention are held constant?  The relevant 
factors are ones that tend to change when the SRB changes, such as the civilian demand for 
people with a certain skill.  These are the variables that would ideally be put in X in equation (1), 
the generic set of factors that the model would control for.   
 
Often it can’t be done fully because the data are not available or the relationship between that 
factor (say, the civilian demand for the skill) and the outcome (reenlistment) can’t be fully 
characterized in such a model.  And, to the extent that there were factors that are not fully held 
constant, there would be potential biases due to alternative explanations (to the causal-effects 
story) for why the treatment and outcome variables are related to each other. 
 
 
The problems: how research can be wrong 
 
There are two main reasons why a research study could give an incorrect answer, or an incorrect 
estimate for the causal effect being examined: (1) imprecision; and (2) systematic biases.  A 
good way to think of these is with political polls.  Candidate A might have a 4-point lead (52-48) 
over Candidate B in a poll.  This could be off from the true proportion of people who will end up 
voting for the candidates for two reasons: 
• Imprecision: Just by random chance, more of those who end up voting for one of the 
candidates happen to be called for the poll.  This is what the “margin of error” reflects, 
which is actually a 95% confidence interval (described in the next section) of the true 
percentage supporting each candidate.  In regressions, greater imprecision results from 
smaller sample sizes, more randomness (or unaccounted-for factors) determining the 
outcome, and too-little variation in the treatment variable. 
• Systematic bias: There might be a systematic error in that supporters of one candidate are 
less likely to answer the phone from the pollster.  Systematic biases stem from alternative 
explanations as to why two variables are related to each other or not.   
 
The distinction between these problems can be seen in Figure 1, which shows two cases of target 
practice.  The person using the left target is imprecise (the shots are scattered widely), but 
seemingly accurate and without bias in that the central tendency of the shots appear to be roughly 
near the center.  In contrast, the person on the right seems very precise in where he/she is 
shooting but seems to be off-target, having a systematic bias that shifts the shot to the right and 
up.  If we were just able to see the shots and wanted to predict where the bulls-eye was, it looks 
like we’d make a good guess (with much uncertainty) on the left, but that we’d be way off-target 
(but with high certainty) on the right. 




Figure 1.  Target practice charts to demonstrate imprecision and systematic biases 
 
 
What separates these two problems (imprecision and systematic biases) is that, with a sample 
size of infinity or the full population, the margin-of-error would be zero, meaning that, if there 
were not any systematic bias, the correct proportions supporting each candidate would be 
estimated by the poll.  Likewise, without any systematic bias, the “average” of the shots would 
be in the center.  But, if there were a systematic bias, then a sample approximating infinity would 
not produce the correct proportions or give an average shot near the center.  This was the case 
with the Literary Digest poll of Landon vs. Roosevelt in the 1936 election, in which the 
magazine polled 2.4 million of its readers, which statistically approximates infinity.  The poll 
indicated that Landon would win the election 57-43, which was far off from Roosevelt’s 
eventual 62-38 victory.  The problem was that the Literary Digest readers had a much higher 
share of Republicans (supporting Landon) than the general population of voters. 
 
In the next two sections, I describe the problems of imprecision and its misinterpretations and 
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4. IMPRECISION AND ITS MISINTERPRETATIONS  
 
How to interpret results in light of imprecision 
 
Let’s consider a recent set of results from an analysis on how diversity affects first-term 
reenlistments in the Navy (Arkes, Tick, and Mehay, 2020).  Table 1 shows an extraction of a few 
results from the report’s Table 7, using columns 1 and 3 from the original table.  The specifics 
are: 
• The sample consists of enlisted first-term sailors who were observed at least 5 quarters on 
their first ship assignment, serving on what we consider to be a medium-sized ship (so 
that they would know most people on the ship and females have been historically part of 
the crew). 
• The dependent variable is a dummy (indicator) variable for whether the sailor reenlisted. 
• The treatment variables are the proportions of females among the officer and enlisted 
crews. 
• There are separate samples for females and males. 
 
In Table 1, the top number in each cell is the coefficient estimate.  The number in parentheses is 
the standard error, which indicates how much uncertainty (imprecision) there is in the coefficient 
estimate.  It looks like having more females increases the probability of reenlistment for males, 
but there is no evidence for such an effect for females.   
 
To depict the imprecision, one can create a 95% confidence interval for the true coefficient, 
which (with enough observations) is the coefficient minus and plus 1.96 standard errors.  These 
95% confidence intervals are shown in Figure 2.  The samples of females and males are 
indicated at the bottom.  The blue bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the effect of a 
one-percentage-point increase in the percentage of females among the officer crew, while the 
gray bars are the same for the effect of more females among the enlisted crew.  Having a bar that 
is fully above (or below) the 0.0 line would indicate statistical significance at the 5% level, as 
indicated by at least two stars.  An estimate that were not significant at the 5% level would have 
a bar that would include 0.0. 
 
There are several important points from this: 
• The 95% confidence interval represents the range of likely values for the true coefficient, 
based on the model’s representation of the population relationships and outcomes that 
occur.  (This is not necessarily the 95% confidence interval for the true causal effect, as 
systematic biases would shift the whole bar – because the ship diversity is random to a 
sailor, we are fairly confident that there are minimal systematic biases in this case.) 
• The confidence intervals are much narrower for males due to the much greater sample 
size for males, which leads to lower standard errors, as seen in Table 1.  Note that the 
coefficient on “Proportion of females among the officer crew” for females is more than 
double of that for males, but statistically significant for males and not females. 
• A coefficient estimate itself (the central point of each bar) is just the central estimate of a 
range of possible true coefficients and is unlikely to be the true coefficient.  
Unfortunately, the coefficient estimate is often described by researchers (including by 
myself in some past studies) and received by readers as the actual effect. 
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• In fact, a value that is in a small range around one standard error away from (either below 
or above) the coefficient estimate is about 60% as likely to be the actual value as being in 
the same-sized range around the coefficient estimate itself.  This means that, for the first 
coefficient estimate in Table 1 of 0.130, the likelihood that the true coefficient is in the 
[0.0036, 0.038] range (about one standard deviation below the coefficient estimate) is 
60% as likely as the true coefficient being in the [0.129, 0.131] range. 
• Perhaps the most responsible representation of results is to give a range of estimates, not 
the coefficient estimate itself.  (In a recent briefing I gave that used a graph similar to 
Figure 2, an Admiral said that this was [unfortunately] the first time he had ever been 
presented results with confidence intervals.) 
• If the 95% confidence interval has a value that is very close to zero or has a value that 
would constitute a trivial impact of little consequence, then a statistically-significant 
result might not be as strong as it appears—see the effect of more females among enlisted 
crew on male retention.   
 
Table 1.  The effects of more Female crew members on first-term retention 
 Female Sailors Male sailors 
Proportion who are Female among: 
Officer crew 0.130 0.064** 
 (0.093) (0.031) 
Enlisted crew 0.013 0.316*** 
 (0.180) (0.061)    
Observations 11,982 81,366 
R-squared 0.056 0.037 
This is from columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 of Arkes, Tick, and Mehay (2020).  
The models also include a constant, racial/ethnic variables, the percentage of 
officers who are prior-enlisted, and fixed effects for the ship, rating, and fiscal 
year.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
Figure 2.  95% confidence intervals for the effects of a 10-percentage-point increase in 
females among a ship’s crew on the probability of reenlistment 
 




Mistakes in hypothesis tests 
 
In Table 1 (and Figure 2), the stars (and the bars relative to the 0.0 line) are representative of 
hypothesis tests.  The typical hypothesis test for a true coefficient is the following: 
- Null hypothesis:   H0: βi = 0 
- Alternative hypothesis:  H1: βi ≠ 0. 
 
From the βi and its associated standard error estimated by the regression model, the researcher 
then makes a conclusion on whether there is adequate evidence to accept the alternative 
hypothesis over the null hypothesis.  
 
But, there are errors in hypothesis tests.  One is a Type I error, or false positive.  This is a 
situation in which there is no effect (or no relationship between two variables), but random 
chance has made the variables appear to be related with this sample.  As an example, in Arkes 
(2019), I describe how the number of annual movies Nicolas Cage appears in was strongly 
positively related to the annual number of drownings in the U.S. in the 1999-2009 period (p-
value = 0.025).  This positive and significant correlation (probably) occurred just by coincidence, 
as there are actually some really good Nic Cage movies, and his bad ones are not so bad that they 
would cause drownings.  The number of drownings, based on random causes, was higher in 
some years.  And some actors and actresses, including Nic Cage, coincidentally had more 
movies in those years.  In fact, out of 1000 actors/actresses, about 50 of them would have a 
statistically significant relationship between their number of movies and the number of 
drownings in the U.S.  Likewise, about 5% of actors and actresses would have a significant 
correlation between the number of movies they are in and the first-term Army attrition rate.  
 
What this implies that is a statistically-significant result (or a low p-value), by itself, has little 
meaning.  The likelihood that there could be a relationship in the first place needs to be 
considered.  As Thomas Jefferson once said, “A thousand phenomena present themselves daily 
which we cannot explain, but where facts are suggested, bearing no analogy with the laws of 
nature as yet known to us, their verity needs proofs proportioned to their difficulty [in being 
explained].”  This means that a strange or surprising (statistically-significant) finding needs 
overwhelming evidence to be considered the true effects.  And even a relationship that has a 
(subjectively-determined) before-the-fact 50-50 shot of being true would need something better 
than significance at the 5% level to be considered strong evidence.  As Nuzzo (2014) calculated, 
such a situation—significance just at the 5% level (p = 0.05) and a 50% before-the-fact chance of 
being a real empirical relationship has only a 71% chance of being a legitimate finding.  That 
said, an accumulation of similar findings provides more evidence.  For example, a series of 
evidence of some significant estimates in how greater diversity (more Black, Hispanic and 
female crew-mates) leads to higher retention, overall, gave some strong evidence for the 
existence of such positive effects of greater diversity (Arkes, Tick, and Mehay, 2020). 
 
The opposite of a Type I error (finding statistical significance when there is no relationship) is a 
Type II error or false negative (failing to detect a real empirical relationship).  This is the basis 
of another common misinterpretation: not finding statistical significance does not indicate that 
there is no effect.  That is, the lack of evidence for an effect does not prove that there is no effect.  
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This is similar to a criminal trial: a not-guilty verdict does not prove innocence.  Yet, this is a 
common misinterpretation throughout academic journals--e.g., Aczel et al. (2018) and Amrhein 
et al. (2019).   
 
In Arkes (2019), I give the following four reasons why there could be an insignificant estimate 
(when estimating the causal effect of some treatment on an outcome): 
1. There actually is no effect of the treatment on the outcome. 
2. There is an effect, but there is not enough observations, power, and precision to detect the 
effect. 
3. There is an effect, but there is systematic bias working against the causal effect, making the 
research unable to detect the effect. 
4. There could some who are positively affected by a treatment and others who are negatively 
affected, and these counteract each other, as all that is estimated is an average effect.  (A good 
example is that a hostile deployment could increase the probability that some reenlist and 
decrease that probability for others.) 
 
All of this supports the idea that an insignificant estimate should not be taken to mean that there 
is not an effect.  This point is highlighted by the comparison, from Table 1, of the estimated 
effects of the “proportion of females among officers” being higher for female than male first-
termers, despite the estimate being significant for males and not females.  The estimate for 
females may have suffered from not having enough power (reason #2). 
 
Along these lines, as Paolella (2018) argues, finding some coefficient estimate on a potential 
cancer cure that just misses out on significance (p = 0.06) for improving outcomes does not mean 
the cure is not effective.  It means the evidence suggests there could be an effect, but it is 
inconclusive and further research would be useful.  This consideration is important to not rule 
out potentially valuable empirical relationships between variables. 
 
As a side note for basketball fans, the first 25 years of research on the “hot hand” in basketball 
found no evidence for the existence of the hot hand (that making prior shots was not associated 
with the probability of making the next shot) and concluded that the hot hand was a “myth” and a 
figment of the collective imaginations of all players and fans.  This has even been stated to be the 
case by a few Nobel Prize winners in Economics.  So, these researchers and Nobel Prize winners 
concluded #1 from the above list, based on the insignificant estimate.  But there were a few of 
these forces working against being able to detect an effect.  This included the samples being 
pretty small (reason #2 above) and there being systematic biases from measurement error 
(described in the next section) in correctly determining whether a player was in a hot-hand state 
or not (Stone, 2012) and the gambler’s fallacy (Miller and Sanjurjo, 2018)—reason #3.   
 
Since 2010, there have indeed been a few articles that have found evidence for the hot hand in 
basketball (e.g., Arkes, 2010; Miller and Sanjurjo, 2018).  And so the proper interpretation of the 
earlier research should not have been “the hot hand does not exist,” but rather “there is no 
evidence for the hot hand.” 
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Why “strength of evidence” should be used instead of hypothesis tests  
 
I have come to believe that hypothesis tests should not be used anymore for the following 
reasons: 
• Hypothesis tests are often mis-interpreted, as “accepting null hypothesis” (that there is no 
relationship between the variables) is not technically accurate. 
• “Rejection of the null hypothesis” has a good chance of being wrong and mis-interpreted. 
• “Insignificance” is ambiguous, as it could have many explanations (see above). 
• They do not consider systematic biases, or the validity of the model. 
• They do not consider the practical significance of the estimate. 
• Given all the above, a hypothesis test seems more final and certain in its conclusion than 
it actually is.  
 
Instead, I believe results should be characterized by the strength of the evidence (e.g., none, 
weak, some, squishy, supportive, moderate, strong, etc.) that takes into account all of these 
factors: 
• The t-stat and p-value—significance at the 1% level should be the minimum benchmark 
for “strong evidence.”  
• The likelihood there could be an effect in the first place.  
• The practical significance of the 95% confidence interval (or range of likely coefficients). 
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5. HOW TO QUICKLY ASSESS RESEARCH FOR SYSTEMATIC 
BIASES 
 
In this section, I will describe a fairly quick approach to identify potential systematic biases and 
to assess research that aims to estimate causal effects.  Most of the time, such biases cannot be 
proven to exist.  What needs to be assessed is whether there is the potential of such biases.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Notional models for setting up the problem 
 
 
To set up the problem, let us consider two cases, as depicted in Figure 3: a generic case in the left 
panel and a model of how average daily TV hours (TV) affect Body-Mass Index (BMI) for 
children, in the right panel.  For these models: 
• The rectangular boxes indicate available variables. 
• The ovals represent variables that are unavailable or non-quantifiable and, thus, not 
included as control variables. 
• The equation being estimated is at the top of each panel. 
• The aim is to estimate how X1 affects Y and how TV affects BMI. 
• All arrows indicate the true effect of a one-unit increase in the pointing variable on the 
variable being pointed at, which are all unknown to us. 
• The arrows labeled “A” are the true causal effects of the treatment on the outcome that 
we hope to estimate -- again, they are unknown. 
• The variables X2 and single-parent are control variables (helping towards properly 
estimating how X1 affects Y and how TV affects BMI).  They are in the regression 
equations but not depicted in the figure for the sake of simplicity. 
 
Whereas we hope that the coefficient estimates for β1 represent how X1 affects Y, and how TV 
hours affects BMI, represented by A, what we estimate for β1 captures all the reasons why X1 
and Y move together and why TV and BMI move together (or do not move together)—that is, 
how Y tends to move with a one-unit higher value of X1.  This includes: 
(1) X1 affects Y  (the value, A, in Figure 3) -- (This is the effect you want to estimate) 
(2) Y affects X1 (B) – This is reverse causality 
(3) Some omitted variable, Z, affects both X1 and Y (C & D) – This is omitted-variables 
bias. 
 
Furthermore, other considerations, not depicted by the figure could dictate whether the estimate 
for β1 is estimating the true effect (A) without any systematic bias.  Note that just because there 
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is not any systematic bias does not mean that the estimate will be exactly the value you want of 
A.  Natural variation could cause imprecision and bring the estimated β1 far from A.  Without 
systematic bias, if we had a sample of infinity observations, we would get exactly A. 
 
Here, I will describe the six main pitfalls, or sources of bias.  These are most of the main biases I 
describe in Arkes (2019), along with one that I have added since then and one that I add here 
because it is very common and particular to military manpower outcomes.   
 
 
Pitfall #1: Reverse causality 
 
The outcome (Y) could affect the treatment variable (X1), causing B to be positive or negative.  
If B were positive (higher Y leads to higher X1), this would contribute positively to how Y 
moves with a one-unit higher value of X1, which would cause a positive bias to the estimate of 
β1, causing it to be higher than A (in the absence of other biases).  If B were negative, it would 
cause a negative bias on the estimate for β1, meaning the estimate for β1 would understate A. 
 
In the TV-BMI example, reverse causality would occur if a higher BMI affected the number of 
TV hours the child watches.  Perhaps greater BMI causes lethargy, leading to more TV watching.  
In that case, B would be positive, and it would contribute to a positive bias on the estimated 
effect of TV on BMI. 
 
 
Pitfall #2: Omitted-variable bias 
 
“I never blame myself when I’m not hitting.  I just blame the bat, and if it keeps up, I 
change bats.  After all, if I know it’s not my fault that I’m not hitting, how can I get mad 
at myself?” 
-- Yogi Berra  
 
This is the most common type of bias, which occurs when some factor that is unobserved or just 
not included as a control variable (Z in Figure 3) affects both the treatment variable and the 
outcome.  Alternatively, the unobserved factor could just be correlated with the treatment, as 
long as it is not a product of the treatment.  The direction of the bias is the direction of the 
product of C and D – i.e., if C > 0 and D < 0, then it would be a negative bias because C*D < 0.  
What happens is that the treatment X1 is getting blamed or credited with the effects of the 
unobservable variable (Z) on the outcome (Y) – just like Yogi’s tangible perceived factor (his 
bat) is getting blamed for the real intangible cause of his slump. 
 
In the TV-BMI case, a possible omitted factor could be the amount of bad-weather days where 
the child lives.  More bad weather could lead to more TV watching (C > 0) and higher BMI  
(D > 0) due to less exercise, so that not controlling for weather could lead to a positive omitted-
variables bias.  There are, of course, other potential sources of omitted-variables bias.  
 
How to assess whether there would be omitted-variables bias is to think about what factors cause 
someone to receive a treatment (or have a higher value of the treatment variable) and could any 
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of those factors that are not controlled for affect the outcome.  Again, in the TV-BMI case, the 
question becomes: What causes some children to watch more TV than others?  Two factors that 
come to mind are “bad weather” (just mentioned) and “busyness of the parents.”  The variable 
for whether the child lives in a single-parent household would likely not fully address the 
busyness of parents.  The unaccounted-for busyness of parents could contribute to more TV and 
perhaps higher BMI for their children if the parents do not have time to prepare nutritious meals 
and rely more on fast food or similar foods.  To the extent that these factors were not controlled 
for, there could be omitted-variables bias. 
 
As for an example that would likely be clean of omitted-variables bias, a study found that non-
paper-filtered coffee leads to greater cardiovascular health problems (Tverdal et al., 2020).  The 
question becomes: What causes some to drink paper-filtered coffee vs. other coffee?  I would 
think the coffee-method choice would just be due to what they were first exposed to or perhaps 
their personal preference, neither of which should be related to cardio-vascular health, in my 
view.  I trusted this study because I cannot imagine that anything related to cardiovascular health 
would impact whether a person drank paper-filtered or non-paper-filtered coffee.  And so any 
relationship between coffee method and health should be from the effects of the coffee method. 
 
 
Pitfall #3: Measurement error 
 
Bias from measurement error occurs if the treatment variable were measured with error.  Errors 
in the measurement of the outcome (dependent variable) does not cause bias but rather 
imprecision.  
 
Measurement error could have many sources.  The most common source that people think of are: 
(1)  the coder mis-types the data; (2) people lie in a survey — think about the alcohol questions 
on the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) survey; and (3) people have a poor 
recollection of events (e.g,. on their diet) when responding to a survey.  Another less-known 
source of measurement error is that the variable poorly represents the concept being measured.  
For example, the four questions to diagnose PTSD from the PDHA is a poor indicator of actual 
PTSD.   
 
The bias on a coefficient estimate when measurement error is present is typically towards zero, 
leading to an understated effect.  This is best seen with a binary treatment variable.  Let’s 
suppose that we want to know how a hostile deployment affects the probability of reenlisting 
(relative to a non-hostile deployment).  And suppose that Figure 4 shows the true reenlistment 
rates with the two types of deployments, which the researcher does not know.  Suppose that there 
are not any confounding factors causing any other bias.  So the true unknown effect of a hostile 
deployment is -20 percentage points.  If a random set of service-persons with a non-hostile 
deployment were mis-classified into the “hostile deployment” category, then the researcher’s 
estimate of the reenlistment rate for the “hostile deployment” category would be higher than 
40%, say 45%.  Thus, the estimated effect would be lower in magnitude, say a -15-percentage-
point effect (45% minus 60%).  It would be possible that the bias is away from zero if it were 
non-random as to what observations have measurement error, but the more likely scenario is that 
the bias in the estimated effect is towards zero. 




This means that, if we were to estimate a coefficient on a treatment variable that was subject to 
measurement error to be close to zero (or insignificant), we would not know whether that was 
due to there not being an effect or measurement error biasing the estimated effect towards zero. 
 
Figure 4.  Notional example to demonstrate the bias from measurement error 
 
 
The same concept holds true for non-binary variables, such as the unemployment rate, but it 
cannot be as easily depicted in a graph.  Let’s take the important issue of how the unemployment 
rate affects reenlistment rates.  The model would be: 
 




R = 0/1 reenlistment decision 
UR = the home-state unemployment rate 
X = a set of other factors, including home-state and year indicator variables 
 
Researchers often use state unemployment rates, typically using a service-person’s home-state 
and controlling for the year and home-state to avoid problems from not being able to control for 
the year when using the national unemployment rate.  The problem, however, is that state 
unemployment rates can have significant error from random sampling error.  This is similar to 
polling margins of error, as the estimated unemployment rates are based on samples within each 
state, some of which are small samples.  Because the error is likely random, the most likely 
direction of the bias on the estimated effect of the unemployment rate would be towards zero.  
What this means is that any such model would likely understate the true effect of the 
unemployment rate on reenlistment rates. 
 
Having state and year controls in the model would be essential to avoid omitted-variables bias, as 
state and year are important reasons why the unemployment rate is higher for some than others 
and could affect the reenlistment rate among those from the state or in a given year.  Yet, the bias 
from measurement error would be exacerbated by having state and year controls.  With those 
controls, it means that the usable variation in the unemployment rate is coming from within-state 
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variation over time.  And the sampling error represents a higher percentage of the within-state 
variation compared to the variation across states.   
 
Note that I have several studies that examine the effects of unemployment rates on various 
outcomes, such as drug use (Arkes, 2007, 2011), cigarette use (Arkes, 2012), divorces (Arkes 
and Shen, 2014), and Navy first-term attrition (Arkes and Mehay, 2014).  I did not realize, when 
conducting these studies, the problem with measurement error and how much the bias is 
exacerbated from having state and year controls.  This means that I was likely understating all of 
these effects. 
 
Also note that, in many manpower studies, the state unemployment rate is used as a control 
variable to capture economic influences on the outcome (e.g., recruiting).  The possibility that 
measurement error could cause a bias towards zero on the unemployment rate suggests that the 
model might not adequately control for the strength of the economy. 
 
 
Pitfall #4: Bad modeling (too many control variables) 
 
“I wouldn’t have had so many hits if I hadn’t hit the ball so hard.” 
-- (notional quote from Yogi Berra) 
 
“Bad modeling” usually comes in the form of using too many control variables.  In particular, if 
one controls for a variable representing one of the mechanisms for why some treatment affects 
an outcome, then he/she would not be estimating the full effect, as the estimated effect would not 
capture the mechanism being controlled for.  Ideally, we would randomly assign a treatment and 
then let it play out rather than controlling for what happens between the treatment and eventual 
outcome. 
 
Consider Figure 5, which examines again the effect of a hostile deployment on the likelihood of 
reenlisting.  There are two mechanisms, in this notional model: a hostile deployment affects 
“sense of making a difference” and “danger exposed to,” which both in turn affect the likelihood 
of reenlisting.  These mechanisms are represented as M1 and M2 in Figure 5, which I have 
intersecting a bit because they will be correlated to some extent.  The mechanism M1, with two 
positive effects along the pathway, would contribute positively to how “hostile deployment” and 
reenlistment move together.  In contrast, M2 would contribute negatively to the two variables 
moving together because it has a positive and negative effect along its path: the effect of a 
“hostile deployment” on “danger” is positive; the effect of more “danger” on the probability of 
reenlistment is negative (in this notional model).  
 
If one were to control for “Sense of making a difference” as such (and shown in the bottom panel 
of Figure 5): 
 
Reenlistment = β1 + β1*(Hostile-deployment) + β2*(Making a difference) + ε  (4) 
 
then it effectively breaks off the arrow from “Hostile deployment” to “Making a difference,” 
which means that the estimate for β1 would just capture M2, as depicted in the bottom panel.  
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(“Sense of making a difference” is held constant as “Hostile deployment” affects the 
reenlistment decision.)  This takes away a positive mechanism, causing a negative bias.  
Technically, part of M2 would be captured by M1, so it could understate M1. 
 
The variable “Making a difference” is considered a mediating factor.  Or, it could be considered 
an outcome in itself.  Regardless, the important point is that, when estimating causal effects, one 
should not control for any factor that comes after the treatment variable.  But, sometimes 
researchers incorrectly do so—including myself in one report below. 
 





Pitfall #5: Incorrect reference group 
 
“Compared to my worst game ever, I did good out there today.” 
-- (notional quote from Yogi Berra) 
 
When subjects of an analysis are categorized into three or more categories for the treatment 
variable, it is important to make sure you have the correct reference group.  There are two main 
considerations for having the proper reference group. 
 
First, the people in the reference group should not be doing something else that could affect the 
outcome.  For example, suppose that we were estimating how oatmeal affects LDL cholesterol 
levels (the bad kind) and that people had the same of one of four different types of breakfasts 
every morning, as shown in Figure 6.  And, let’s say we estimated this model: 
 
LDL = β0 + β1*(oatmeal) + ε       (5) 
 
(The variable “oatmeal” is a 0/1 variable for eating oatmeal every morning.) 
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This means that the reference group would be everyone in the categories not controlled for, 
which would be a mix of the three groups other than oatmeal eaters.  The problem is that some in 
the reference group are doing something instead of eating oatmeal that could affect the outcome 
of LDL—they are drinking milk or eating bacon & eggs. 
 
Figure 6.  Notional example of breakfast choice and LDL cholesterol 
 
 
And so, it is possible that oatmeal has no actual effect on LDL but it appears to reduce LDL 
because some in the reference group are doing something that causes LDL to be higher.  The 
proper reference group should probably be just the “toast & avocado” group—not because it has 
the same level but because, I believe, “toast & avocado” is neutral to LDL.  To make “toast & 
avocado” the reference group, we would simply control for the other two categories leaving just 
“toast & avocado” as the group that does not have a variable in the model: 
 
LDL = β0 + β1*(oatmeal) + β2*(cereal & milk) + β1*(bacon & eggs) + ε  (6) 
 
which would produce (based on Figure 6): 
 
Predicted LDL = 100 + 0*(oatmeal) + 20*(cereal & milk) + 20*(bacon & eggs)  (7) 
 
The second consideration for having the proper reference group is that the reference group 
should represent the counterfactual, or what the person would have been doing if not receiving 
the treatment.  But sometimes there is no clear counterfactual, so there would be no clear 
reference group.  For example, suppose that we were estimating how long-lasting deployments 
(more than 6 months) affect retention, and we have the data in Figure 7. 
 
The conventional approach would be to estimate the following model, using “no deployment” as 
the reference group: 
 
retention = β0 + β1*(1-6 months) + β2*(more than 6 months) + ε.  (8) 
 
But, in this case, the likely counterfactual to a deployment greater than 6 months would be a 
deployment 1-6 months.  And so, what might look like no effect in the current set up (comparing 
“more-than-6-months” to “no deployment”) would actually be a negative effect of long 
deployments of -0.10, if the “1-6 months” category were used as the reference group. 
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Figure 7.  Retention rate based on length of deployment 
 
 
I was part of a report that made this mistake in an analysis on how the intensity of a deployment 
affects the likelihood of screening positive for PTSD, which was published in an academic 
journal (Shen, Arkes, and Pilgrim, 2009).  While there were other variables on estimating the 
effects of Iraq/Afghanistan deployments, the problem occurred with the analysis on the length of 
deployment.  Effectively, we used a deployment of 1-60 days as the reference group, the 
coefficient estimates were: 
• Deployment of 61-180 days: 0.011 
• Deployment of 181+ days:    0.022 
These are large estimated effects, given that about 0.04 (4%) of the sample screened positive for 
PTSD.  In the abstract, we said: “This probability [of PTSD] is increased by 2.2 percentage 
points for those deployed longer than 180 days.”  But, I now do not believe that a short (1-60 
day) deployment was the best reference group.  That would be a rare case, and so the most likely 
counterfactual for most personnel would have been a deployment of 61-180 days, which would 
have suggested an effect of 0.011 (which is 0.022 – 0.011).  Furthermore, those on short 
assignments might have been doing something else that could affect PTSD, such as having a 
special assignment that involved a hostile situation. 
 
 
Pitfall #6: Excess supply for manpower outcomes 
 
This is a pitfall that is particularly relevant for military manpower research.  There is often 
excess supply in many manpower outcomes.  For example, sometimes there are more people 
wanting to reenlist than able to reenlist, and there are more hoping to enlist than there are spots 
available.  This often occurs naturally, but it can be created by certain events, such as an MOS 
being eliminated.  
 
Most often, we would be interested in how a policy intervention (e.g., increased advertising) 
affects the quantity-supplied (e.g., the number of people willing to enlist).  But, the outcomes we 
observe, when aggregated, represent the minimum of quantity-demanded (by the service) and 
quantity-supplied.   
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This is a pervasive problem in many (perhaps most) military manpower studies.  The bias could 
be overstating or understating the true effect.  It depends on whether the excess supply was 
greater with the treatment (or higher levels of the treatment) than it was without the treatment.  
For example, if a new advertising campaign were to increase the number of people willing to 
enlist into the Army by 20,000 but there were only 10,000 slots left, then the estimated effect of 
the advertising campaign would be understated by one-half.  I provide another example of this in 
the discussion on research on the effects of bonuses in the next section.  
 
 
Pitfalls and strategies for other regression objectives--forecasting/prediction and 
determining predictors 
 
The two other main objectives of regression analysis (other than estimating causal effects) are: 
• Forecasting/prediction: A researcher attempts to obtain the best forecast or prediction of 
an outcome.  For example, a service might wish to forecast first-term enlisted attrition 
rates.  Or they might want to get the best prediction of whether an individual service-
person would attrite. 
• Determining predictors: A researcher might want to know the best or most useful 
predictors for an outcome.  For example, one might want to know what the best single 
predictor of suicide in the military is. 
 
For these two objectives, most of the normal pitfalls (sources of bias) do not apply.  Meeting the 
objective does not depend on obtaining unbiased estimates of causal effects.  In fact, in some 
sense, it can be useful for one factor to represent other factors (and get blamed for or credited 
with its effects), as it makes the factor a better predictor or makes the forecast more accurate. 
 
For forecasting/prediction, the optimal strategy is to throw the kitchen sink of variables into the 
model, only being concerned about variables subject to reverse causality.   
 
For determining predictors, the optimal strategy, as I outlined in Arkes (2019), is to just include 
one factor at a time.  Unfortunately, a common mistake by researchers is to include many 
variables in the model, clouding up the interpretation.  For example, Shen, Cunha, and Williams 
(2016) examined the predictors of suicide in the military.  They essentially threw the kitchen sink 
of variables in the model, and what results is a series of indicators of how these factors are 
related to suicide, after controlling for other factors, many of which could be outcomes 
themselves.  I imagine DoD would be more interested in how certain factors (e.g., divorce, 
anxiety disorder, enlistment waivers, a PTSD diagnosis) are related to suicide, rather than how 
they are related to suicide beyond the effects on outcomes such as self-inflicted harm, other 
mental disorders, and many of the other factors included in the model.  When I was asked by the 
authors to review an earlier version of this paper, I said that their model had no useful 
information because they controlled for so much and had the interpretation problem mentioned 
here.  One of the researchers agreed with me but said that they were keeping it as it was because 
this was how it was always done. 
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A note on random assignments 
 
The ideal method to avoid many of the pitfalls is to conduct experiments.  One example is the 
enlistment-bonus experiment from the early 1980s in which potential enlistees were randomized 
a bonus amount to determine how the bonus affected the likelihood of enlisting, which Polich, 
Dertouzos, and Press (1986) reported on. 
 
It is easy to imagine having such experiments today.  Theoretically, there could be experiments 
that randomize such things as SRB’s or even in setting quotas for recruiters or recruiting stations.   
 
That said, such experiments might be unrealistic to implement and properly estimate today.  If 
one person were randomized a lower bonus than another, then they might easily learn about 
others receiving a higher bonus (perhaps through the many online groups in the military) and not 
reenlist not just from the bonus being too low but also because they felt they got the short end of 
the stick.  In recruiting, if quotas were randomized each month, recruiters with a low quota in a 
given month could “trade” a contract in a given month to a recruiter with a higher quota in 
exchange for a contract next time they get randomly assigned a high quota. 
 
One point from this is that that experiments might not be the answer.  But also, this discussion 
highlights the challenges in conducting quantitative military manpower research. 
 
 
Synthesis and summary of the biases 
 
In military manpower research, accurate- and precisely-estimated effects are often needed.  For 
example, policymakers need to know what SRB to set to achieve a desired reenlistment rate.  In 
those cases, any bias from one of the five sources above (or other sources) would hamper efforts 
to set the optimal bonus, as would any non-trivial imprecision of the estimate. 
 
Researchers need to be honest and forthright about the validity of their research.  Responsible 
research means fully disclosing any potential alternative explanations to the given results that the 
researchers could not rule out, given the data or methods they used. 
 
As a quick summary of the biases, the important questions to ask are: 
• What causes some to get a treatment or to have high values of the treatment 
variable?   
If it is the outcome, there’s reverse causality.  If it is some factor that also affects the 
outcome, there could be omitted-variables bias, if that factor is not fully controlled for. 
• Is the treatment variable accurately measured and does it accurately represent the 
concept being measured? 
If not, there would be bias from measurement error, most likely towards zero. 
• Are any variables that could be products of the treatment variable being used as 
control variables? 
If so, then it would be bad modeling, and the full effect of the treatment variable would 
not be estimated. 
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• For a categorization, does the reference group represent the correct counterfactual, 
or are those in the reference group doing something else instead of the “treatment” 
that could impact the outcome? 
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6. EXAMPLES OF STUDIES (MOST WITH SERIOUS FLAWS) 
 
In this section, I scrutinize several quantitative military manpower studies, all coming from some 
of the top research organizations in the field.  I assess the studies by raising the main questions I 
would ask if I were refereeing the article/report for a journal: whether there were any systematic 
biases (based on the pitfalls highlighted in the prior section), whether there is an explanation for 
the results that is alternative to the causal-effects story that the authors are concluding, and 
whether the conclusions were responsible.   
 
This set of studies supports my contentions that much of the research in this field is highly-
flawed and that there is generally a negative relationship between the validity of a study and its 
usefulness—I am not testing these contentions, but rather offering evidence for them.  I fully 
acknowledge that I might not be capturing a good portion of military-manpower research.  I am 
speaking from my experience from the manpower studies I have seen, and I have many more 
examples not included here.  These are mostly studies that I have considered for teaching my 
class (Applied Manpower Analysis) and studies that I have come across when researching the 
background on topics that I was myself investigating.  And, for all except the first study, I would 
recommend rejecting the study from being published in an academic journal due to having 
alternative explanations that could not be reasonably ruled out and not recognizing or disclosing 
those potential (or certain) biases. 
 
Some of this research might not have been DoD-sponsored research, but what is important is that 
much of this was research that got funded and cost a lot to DoD.  I invite others to independently 
review my assessment of these studies. 
 
 
Peer effects in academic outcomes at the Air Force Academy 
 
Carrell et al. (2009) used random assignment of freshmen cadets at the Air Force Academy 
(AFA) to squadrons and roommates to examine whether being around peers with stronger 
backgrounds leads to better grades.  To represent the “background” of peers, they used measures 
of academic success and physical and leadership scores from before entering the AFA.   
 
Recall the question I posed above to assess whether there would be omitted-variables bias: What 
causes some to have higher values of the treatment (peers with stronger backgrounds)?  At the 
AFA, it should just come down to randomness, as the assignment of cadets to roommates and 
squadrons is random (other than making sure there was relatively equal distribution of athletes 
and people from underrepresented groups in each squadron).  Thus, there should not be any 
omitted-variables bias.  Also, the background characteristics are measured before the peers 
entered the AFA, so there should not be any reverse causality. 
 
Measurement error could be a problem if one were interested in the characteristics of the actual 
and relevant peers of the cadet.  This would likely cause a downward bias in the estimated 
effects.  However, if we were just interested in the effects of the roommate and squadron-mates, 
then there would not be any obvious measurement error. 
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For all intents and purposes, this is one of the most valid studies I am aware of that attempts to 
estimate causal effects on something related to military manpower.  That said, imprecision was a 
concern because many of the coefficient estimates that were statistically significant were not 
very robustly significant in that the bottom ends of the 95% confidence intervals were close to 
zero.  Furthermore, there does not appear to be much actionable policy that come from this 
study.  It is close to a zero-sum game; if the AFA were to move around cadets with the stronger 
backgrounds so others can enjoy the peer effects they would offer, some will gain, others will 
lose. 
 
I included a discussion of this study to demonstrate what a highly-valid study looks like, which 




The effects of having skill-relevant shore assignments on 2nd-term retention 
 
This discussion pokes holes in one of my studies (Arkes and Golding, 1998).  The study, 
conducted while I worked for CNA, occurred during a strong push to outsource more functions 
of DoD, as large cost savings were being realized from such efforts.  As functions typically 
conducted by military personnel (e.g., aircraft maintenance) were being considered for 
outsourcing, this study aimed to estimate the secondary costs of such a policy.  Secondary costs 
could stem from more Navy sailors having to work in billets unrelated to their skill when on their 
3-year shore tour, leading to boredom, skill degradation, and perhaps more sailors choosing to 
leave the Navy.  Understanding these secondary costs of outsourcing would have been important 
to make a sound decision on how extensive the outsourcing of military shore billets should be. 
 
We estimated how working in a skill-relevant shore billet (“in-skill”) or as an “instructor” on 
one’s first shore tour affected whether the sailor reenlists.  The first consideration is what causes 
some to work in-skill and as instructors and others not on their first shore tour.  While there 
might be some random luck involved, it probably largely comes down to the more highly-
qualified (perhaps those with the strongest evaluations) who would be more likely to get the 
skill-relevant shore billets.  While we could control for AFQT and other tangible measures of 
proficiency, it is doubtful we could fully control for such proficiency.  And so we likely had 
some prominent omitted-variables bias (in the direction of overstating the effects of these billets 
on reenlistment).   
 
There was also bias from measurement error.  To identify whether a sailor was working in a 
skill-relevant billet on their shore tour, we determined whether their Primary or Secondary Navy 
Enlisted Classification code matched the Duty Navy Enlisted Classification code.  This was 
highly imperfect in correctly classifying people as being “in-skill” or not.  The measurement 
error probably led to a bias towards zero.  One other potential problem was that we had included 
a mediating factor as a control variable — whether  the sailor had training before the shore tour 
(mislabeled as “sea” tour).  There is no way to determine which of these biases dominates the 
others, and so in the end we could not really answer the research question. 
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This was an important topic.  But, the study had hardly any credibility due to these problems.  
Unfortunately, as the main author, I minimized these problems relative to how potentially 
damaging they likely were to the validity and ultimate conclusions of the analysis.  I (somewhat 
irresponsibly) stated, after noting problems with interpreting the estimated effect of being an 
instructor: “As for the estimated [effect] of working in-skill, we are more confident that [it is] 
close to the true [effect].” 
 
 
The effects of hostile deployments on reenlistments 
 
As part of an effort to understand the stressors on the forces from the Global War of Terrorism 
(GWOT), a RAND study estimated the effect of a hostile deployment on the likelihood of 
reenlistment for enlisted personnel in each service (Hosek and Martorell, 2009).  The authors 
effectively classified personnel into one of three categories:  
(a) no deployment; 
(b) a non-hostile deployment; 
(c) a hostile deployment … technically, they could be in both (b) and (c), but that is not relevant 
for the discussion. 
 
The model was: 
 
reenlistment = β0 + β1*(hostile deployment) + β2*(non-hostile deployment) + β3*X + ε   (9) 
 
where X represents a series of other control factors, including MOS controls, and in some cases, 
the SRB. 
 
When there is a classification like this, one needs to be certain that the correct reference group is 
established, as discussed with regard to Pitfall #5 in the prior section.  By including categories 
(b) and (c) as variables, the reference group becomes those with “no deployment.”  But, the 
question should be: With GWOT, what category did the service-persons having the hostile 
deployment come from?  Was it “no deployment,” “non-hostile deployment,” or some from 
each?  If they came from “non-hostile deployments,” then that should have been the reference 
group.  If those having the “hostile deployments” would have, had it not been for GWOT, come 
from both categories of “no deployment” and “non-hostile deployments,” then perhaps both 
groups should have been in the reference group (meaning the “non-hostile deployment” variable 
would also be excluded).  But, that would be no guarantee that the reference group contains the 
correct proportions in these two groups. 
 
My (military) students have generally believed that those who had “hostile deployments” would 
more likely have otherwise had “non-hostile deployments.”  And, if that were the case, then the 
results would have been greatly biased by using the incorrect reference group.  To demonstrate, 
let’s take the middle set of results for the Marine Corps from Hosek and Martorell’s Table 7.1 (p. 
40 in the report), as shown in Table 2 below.  Both estimates are highly statistically significant, 
based on the magnitude of the coefficient estimate relative to the standard error. 
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Figure 8 then demonstrates what the reenlistment rate differences would be based on those 
coefficient estimates.  I created a notional reenlistment rate for their reference group (“no 
deployment”) of 30%.  I then added the coefficient estimates for the other two categories.  As it 
stands, a “hostile deployment” is estimated to significantly increase the likelihood of 
reenlistment by 1.5 percentage points. 
 
However, if a “non-hostile deployment” were the correct reference group (as my students believe 
to be the case), then the estimated effect of a “hostile deployment” would be -7.1 percentage 
points (31.5% minus 38.6%).  This would give an entirely different (and opposite) result to what 
Hosek and Martorell (2009) reported.  Thus, the results and conclusions on causality — e.g., 
“[F]or the Marine Corps, hostile deployments increase reenlistment by about 1.5 percentage 
points” — were likely misguided. 
 
 
Table 2.  Estimates for how the type of deployment affects retention for the Marine Corps--
from Table 7.1 of Hosek and Martorell (2009) 





Hostile deployment 0.015 
(0.003) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
See Hosek-Martorell for the other factors that are held constant. 
 
 





The effects of distance-learning on military academic outcomes  
 
This is a very important topic, as educating and training the force is integral for the future of 
DoD, particularly with the transition to the use of more technology.  Furthermore, distance-
learning might be a more cost-effective method of delivering education and training. 




In a study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and that was published in the 
academic journal, Contemporary Economic Policy, Bacolod and Chaudhary (now, Hartmann) 
(2018) attempt to estimate the effects of distance-learning on academic outcomes for students at 
the NPS.  They find that those in the distance-learning program, compared to resident students, 
were more likely to fail or not-complete a class and were less likely to graduate from the degree 
program. 
 
In their conclusions, they say that their analysis “suggests a large, negative, and significant 
impact of distance education programs on academic outcomes.”  They use the modified language 
of “suggests” to acknowledge that there are difficulties when assignment to the treatment is not 
random.  Earlier in the article, they argue that their main challenge was a difference in the type of 
person who does distance-learning vs. residence education.  And, they imply that their method 
largely addresses this problem: “To address this problem, we implement propensity score 
matching using a rich set of observable characteristics of students.”  One thing to note is that the 
propensity-score-matching only can control for observable characteristics, not the more 
notorious unobserved characteristics.  Personally, for this reason, I have never thought that 
propensity-score-matching can address the problem of non-random assignment to the treatment. 
 
However, the larger problem comes down again to whether there are alternative explanations for 
the results.  And, there is a big alternative explanation that was not mentioned.  Resident students 
are assigned to NPS as their duty station.  The education is their primary duty.  It is their job to 
perform well, receive the necessary education, and obtain their degree.  Failing to do so would 
leave a negative mark on their record.  In contrast, those doing distance-learning are quite 
different in a few important ways: 
(1) They have a full-time military assignment, and so the (voluntary) distance-learning is done 
on their own time and their actual duty assignment could get in the way of their school work. 
(2) Failing a class or failing to complete the degree would not impact their official record or 
evaluations, as their supervisors only evaluate them on their performance in their duty 
assignment. 
 
This means that there is likely omitted-variables bias in that the “distance-learning” variable is 
correlated with: (1) having other work duties that could get in the way; and (2) not having to fear 
negative evaluations if one does not complete the program or pass a course.  Both of these 
factors could affect the outcomes of course and degree completion. 
 
This means that the higher failure and class-drop-out rates and lower graduation rate for the 
distance learners (compared to the resident students) is almost certainly partly or entirely due to 
the other demands on their schedule or differences in incentives based on how their evaluations 
would be impacted by non-completion.  Thus, the “distance-learning” effect is getting blamed 
for these other correlated factors.  And so the results of this analysis, in the end, do not suggest 
anything. 
 
The referees at Contemporary Economic Policy, I imagine, were not aware of these alternative 
explanations.  And, the alternative explanations were either not recognized or disclosed by the 
authors.   




Unfortunately, sometimes it is the case that the less forthright authors are on potential 
shortcomings of their research, the more likely it is to get published. 
 
 
The effects of bonuses on retention 
 
As I alluded to in the second paragraph of this report, the first 45 years of research on how 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) affect retention has been highly flawed.  This research 
issue is important to help the services set the optimal bonus that elicits enough retention without 
overpaying for retention.  I will give a general description of the literature, as I described in 
Arkes (2018). 
 
There are four main sources of biases that have plagued such research, two of which were never 
or hardly recognized in the multitudes of analyses.  The typical model is the following: 
 
reenlistment = β0 + β1*(SRB) + β2*(X) + ε     (10) 
 
where X would include many factors, most importantly state and year indicator variables.  And 
perhaps a good way of thinking about this is with Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Reasons why SRB’s are related to the reenlistment decision 
 
 
Again, we hope our estimate of β1 accurately and precisely estimates A in Figure 9, which is the 
true causal effect of a one-level increase in SRB on the probability of reenlisting – and is 
unknown to us.  But our estimate of β1 reflects all the reasons why SRB and reenlistment 
decisions move together, after factoring out the variables in X. 
 
These models have been estimated as a straightforward regression model, as depicted in 
Equation (10).  In addition, some researchers have estimated Annualized Cost of Leaving 
(ACOL) models.  In ACOL models, the researchers:  
• compile current and expected future military and civilian earnings 
• make an assumption on how much service-persons discount future earnings, on average 
• calculate the Annualized-Cost-of-Leaving (the ACOL variable) of the present discounted 
value of (present and future) military minus civilian earnings, from current military 
earnings and assumptions on future military and civilian earnings 
• estimate how reenlistment decisions are related to the ACOL variable 
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• simulate how a one-level increase in SRB would change the ACOL variable 
• apply the coefficient estimate on the ACOL variable to estimate how the probability of 
reenlistment would change from that SRB increase. 
 
Hansen and Wenger (2002) use this approach, and they demonstrate that the estimated effect of 
SRBs on retention changes significantly with changes in assumptions in the model (such as on 
the discount rate). 
 
The following biases apply to any method or type of model, an ACOL model or straight-forward 




Bias #1: Direct reverse causality or omitted-variables bias 
 
This is the conventional bias that most researchers recognized.  Obviously, SRB’s are not 
assigned randomly.  And, one of the most likely reasons why SRB’s change is that reenlistment 
rates are too high or too low. 
 
Thus, one way we can think of this, from Figure 9, is “reverse causality” in that the propensity of 
personnel to reenlist has a negative effect on the SRB (B < 0), and this contributes negatively to 
why the SRB and reenlistment decision move together, or a negative bias on the estimated effect 
of the SRB.  (I call this “direct reverse causality” to distinguish it from the next bias, which is 
“indirect reverse causality” and in the opposite direction.) 
 
This could also be considered omitted-variables bias, as the model would be unable to control for 
the civilian market opportunities or military conditions (e.g., OPTEMPO) that could affect 
reenlistment rates, which in turn would affect the SRB.  As the example in Figure 9 shows, better 
civilian economic opportunities or higher OPTEMPO would lead to a higher SRB level needed 
(C > 0) and lower reenlistment rates (D < 0).  This, likewise, would contribute to the SRB and 
the probability of reenlistment to be negatively related and a negative bias on the estimate for β1. 
 
 
Bias #2: Indirect reverse causality 
 
The idea with this bias is that reenlistments cause changes in how SRB’s are coded by the 
researcher.  To code an SRB for a subject in the analysis, the researcher needs to use a date to 
determine what the available SRB was at the decision time.  The typical approach, as described 
in Arkes (2018) is that researchers use the date the reenlistment goes into effect.  An alternative 
and less-used approach is to use a fixed date relative to the End-of-Active-Obligated-Service 
date.  With the typical approach, the “indirect reverse causality” comes from how the SRB is 
coded (and how the reenlistee times his/her reenlistment): 
• Those not reenlisting just leave at the end of their contract, regardless of what the SRB is. 
• Those reenlisting sometimes attempt to target the reenlistment to a time when the SRB 
tends to be higher.  (If they believe the SRB is low when they are ready to reenlist, they 
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might wait until the SRB increases, perhaps even extending their service with the hope 
that the SRB increases.) 
 
And so, the decision to reenlist does not positively affect the SRB, but it leads to the decision 
being made at a time when the SRB tends to be higher, thus causing the researcher to code a 
higher SRB—this is why I call it “indirect reverse causality.”  This contributes to a positive bias 
in the relationship between SRB and reenlistment. 
 
Alternatively, some studies (e.g., Hosek and Martorell, 2009) use pay data to estimate the 
average SRB level for all personnel in a given MOS reenlisting in a given quarter.  This has the 
same problem, as those reenlisting might try to make their reenlistment point at a time of higher 
SRBs. 
 
This bias can be seen in Figure 10, which is a notional example (that is close to what really 
happened) with Navy Nukes in the Great Recession in FY2009.  Because of the lack of civilian 
job opportunities at the time, most Nukes wanted to reenlist, and so the Nuke SRB funds ran out 
in May, causing the SRB to go to zero for the rest of the fiscal year, as shown in the figure.  
Those who were able to and wanted to reenlist from that point through September chose not to 
reenlist but rather wait for the next reenlistment window or extend to FY2010 so that they would 
not miss out on a roughly $80,000 bonus.  And so the reenlistment rate went to zero (as some 
still left the Navy).   
 
It is possible that the SRB had no effect at all on the SRB, but we would still see the pattern in 
Figure 10 due to no one reenlisting starting in May (because those wanting to reenlist wait or 
extend).  And, from this, we would mistakenly estimate that one level of SRB leads to about an 
8-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of reenlisting – based on the approximate change in 
reenlistment rates (about 55 percentage points) divided by the change in SRB (7 levels) from the 
October-April period to the May-September period.  We would severely overstate the SRB effect 
in this case. 
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Bias #3: Measurement error 
 
With the administrative data that most people use for these types of studies, researchers know the 
date the reenlistment begins, but not the contract date that the decision was made and that locked 
in the SRB.  The SRB can change in the meantime.  Furthermore, with somewhat frequent mid-
year SRB changes (in response to a service getting too few or too many reenlistments), there 
might be multiple SRBs a service-person has available during his/her reenlistment window.  As 
researchers, we can only include one of those in the model. 
 
Both of these cases would lead to measurement error.  And, the likely impact of the measurement 
error is a bias towards zero in the estimated effect of SRB’s on the likelihood of reenlisting.  
(This is not depicted in Figure 9 above.) 
 
If the ACOL models were used (as described above), then any measurement error would be 
greatly exacerbated due to any errors in the assumed discount rate and due to using the predicted 
civilian earnings in the model, which almost certainly would not match a given service-person’s 
actual civilian earnings expectation. 
 
 
Bias #4: Excess supply 
 
We are interested in how the SRB affects the willingness of someone to reenlist.  But what 
researchers observe with administrative data is whether a service person actually reenlisted.  If 
there were an excess supply of reenlisters (more service-persons willing to reenlist than the 
service would accept), then this could lead to either a positive or negative bias: 
• If a one-level change in the SRB would elicit a 0.05 increase in willingness-to-reenlist 
(e.g., from 40% to 45%) but there are only slots available for a 0.03 increase, then what 
we observe is the 0.03 increase.  This would contribute to a negative bias, understating 
the effect of the SRB on reenlistment propensity. 
• If an MOS were to be eliminated, both the SRB and reenlistment rate for those in the 
MOS would go to zero—the service persons who laterally-transfer would likely be 
counted in the new MOS.  When compared to the MOS’ prior reenlistment rate and SRB 
level (say, 40% and SRB = 2), it would look like a 0.20 effect of a one-level increase in 
the SRB: (0.40 – 0.20)/(2 – 0) = 0.20.  This would contribute to a positive bias. 
• In general, any situation in which there is excess supply in which more service persons 
are willing to than are able to reenlist would contribute to a bias that could be positive or 
negative, depending on the situation. 
 
 
Can these biases be corrected? 
 
I suggested a partial fix for two of the biases.  For the first bias on (direct) reverse causality, I 
controlled for the interacted effect of MOS and fiscal year.  The general idea is that changes in 
SRB within a given MOS and fiscal year would likely be more due to a service’s corrections 
after miscalculations of how many would reenlist and less likely due to changes in willingness-
to-reenlist among those in the MOS.  But this likely resulted in other problems.  Most notably, it 
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creates an econometric phenomenon that elicits a change in how much certain years and MOS’ 
contribute to the overall estimated effect.  And it exacerbated any bias from measurement error, 
similar to how having state and year controls exacerbates bias from measurement error for a 
variable on state unemployment rates. 
 
To address the second bias on the indirect reverse causality, I assigned the SRB based on a set 
date relative to the EAOS, not the actual decision date.  I demonstrate how doing so caused a 
large reduction in the estimated SRB effect, which is consistent with reducing the large positive 
bias.  But this might also exacerbate the measurement error, which may also have contributed to 
the lower estimated effects. 
 
Note that the biases mentioned here would likely apply to estimating the effect of any other type 
of retention bonus in the military, such as the large bonus offered to Surface Warfare Officers. 
 
There are several lessons from this.  I also made the argument that there was no solution for the 
3rd and 4th biases from measurement error and excess supply.  In addition, this is a common 
example of how fixing one problem introduced another problem.  It demonstrates the importance 
of acknowledging all problems.  Most importantly, the study pointed out that: (1) years of 
accepted research on a topic can be wrong; and (2) there are things that just can’t be properly 
estimated.  (And it provides a good example of wasted time and money being devoted to 
research that, in the end, does not provide anything useful.) 
 
 
The Dynamic Retention Model (DRM) 
 
The DRM is the DoD’s go-to model for any major manpower-related policy evaluation.  Perhaps 
most notably, it was used to analyze how the new Blended Retirement System would impact 
retention (Asch, Mattock, and Hosek, 2017).  It has also been used recently to evaluate the 
effects of special and incentive (S&I) pay for Air Force career enlisted aviators (Tong et al., 
2020).   
 
The DRM is highly-complex so that few people understand how to interpret it, and just as few 
know how to code it.  I speculate that DoD officials like and trust it so much because of its 
complexity.  DoD officials might collectively believe that it must be useful because of how 
complicated it is … and perhaps because no one has poked holes in it … until now.  
 
The DRM is a more-advanced version of the ACOL model described above.  The model 
estimates its own discount rate (so an assumed value does not have to be used) and a taste-for-
military component—although, I am not convinced that estimating these is a good thing.  
 
The subjects of the analysis would have variation in Regular Military Compensation (Basic Pay, 
BAH, and BAS).  And, this variation in compensation is used in the DRM to estimate how 
“military relative to civilian pay” affects retention decisions.  Based on how personnel’s 
retention decisions vary due to estimated pay differences over time, the researchers apply what 
the DRM estimates as the response behavior to the pay changes.  
 







The problems with the DRM 
 
One major problem is that, when there are differences in pay across personnel, there are also 
differences in other important factors that could affect retention—the factors that cause the 
differences in pay.  These include experience level, rank, marital status, and the number of 
dependents.  And so, higher pay for one service-person might be unduly blamed for or credited 
with the effects of those other factors.  This is omitted-variables bias, as described above. 
 
Another problem is measurement error in the pay variable, and there is plenty.  In most studies 
(e.g., Asch el al., 2017), I believe the military pay just includes Regular Military Compensation.  
However, in Tong et al. (2020), it appears that the pay variable includes the Special and 
Incentive (S&I) compensation.  The studies that exclude bonuses and special pays are subject to 
measurement error in the military-pay component of the model.  At the same time, any study 
including such pays would subject the model to all four of the biases discussed above in the 
models estimating the SRB effects on retention.   
 
The DRM faces additional measurement error by making hypothetical estimates of civilian 
earnings.  For example, in Asch, Mattock, and Hosek (2017), the authors assume all enlisted 
personnel would have the same civilian pay as the median wage for male full-time workers with 
their given experience level and an Associate’s Degree, while officers would have the same 
civilian pay as the 80th percentile of males in full-time positions with a master’s degree in a 
management-related occupation.  This means that the “earnings” or “pay” variable has an even 
larger amount of measurement error, causing further bias.   
 
The bias from measurement error would likely affect their estimated discount factor (which 
indicates how valuable a dollar is next year compared to a dollar today) as well as the “taste-for-
military” parameter.  As an example, suppose there are two service-persons who are facing a 
reenlistment decision at the same time from the same MOS.  The model would say that both have 
the same earnings capabilities in the civilian labor market.  But, the reality is that one would 
expect to make more income in the civilian market than the other, based on their own private 
information.  Any difference in their decision to reenlist might be due to that difference in 
civilian earnings potential, but in the model it would be attributed to differences in the “taste for 
military” or the discount factor. 
 
 
Overall assessment of the DRM 
 
In Asch, Mattock, and Hosek (2017), they mention some of the limitations (although not all), but 
they then claim that the model fits the data pretty well.  But, fitting the data well is not indicative 
of a model that works.  Any bias in the estimates towards a stronger pay effect would make the 
model look like it better fits the data.  This could come from a positive omitted-variables bias 
(i.e., in the same direction as the estimated pay effect).  This point is demonstrated in Arkes 
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(2018): in Table VII, the models that have greater bias from the indirect reverse causality (the 
left-most column) have the better fit, as measured by R-squared. 
 
Let me qualify my critique of the DRM by noting that I am not an expert on it.  It would surprise 
me if so, but there could be little intricacies in the model that address the problems I mention of 
omitted-variables bias, measurement error, excess supply, and more.  But, in the studies that I 
have read about the DRM, the limitations have just discussed what factors the model was unable 
to capture, not the more important consideration of whether there were alternative explanations 
for their results, why there might be bias, and what direction it might be in.   
 
I have not seen in the DRM studies any mention of the problems of omitted-variables bias, 
measurement error, or excess supply. 
 
My best guess is that the DRM model has been highly-flawed and such models have not given 
anything better than what a SWAG would have produced for the effects of certain policies on 
retention.  If I am wrong, at the very least such models should be given more scrutiny and 
discussion of the potential pitfalls and should have better justification than just “fitting the data 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This report has highlighted that there are flaws in many (if not most) quantitative manpower 
studies in the field of military manpower.  I fully acknowledge that there are some valid 
quantitative studies out there.  And, while one might argue that I am cherry-picking bad studies, 
there are many more flawed studies that I did not describe here (including some of mine, before I 
learned better) from across all of the major research organizations conducting military-
manpower research for DoD. 
 
The general finding of flaws in research is not alone to the field of military manpower.  Many 
psychology studies with fascinating results, even ones with randomized control trials, have failed 
to be replicated, implying that the original findings were false positives or the product of some 
bias.  This is also true of economics studies, although there is less evidence on failing to replicate 
experiments in economics, perhaps due to there being fewer experiments.  But, the wide 
divergence of results on given topics (e.g., for studies on the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment) highlight the imprecise and flawed nature of econometric studies, particularly in 
the absence of random assignment. 
 
If I were asked 5 years ago to do the in-skill analysis I described above (Arkes and Golding, 
1998), I would have pretty much done the same thing, although being a little more measured in 
my conclusions.  If I were asked today, I would have taken a few days to investigate the 
feasibility, and I would have gone back to my sponsor and told him/her that this cannot be done 
with any validity or credibility, and I would have asked if there was anything else I could do 
instead. 
 
If I were conducting the distance-learning study (Bacolod and Chaudhary/Hartmann, 2018) 
discussed in the prior section, I would have recognized from the start that the nature of distance-
learning matriculation is so different from resident-learning that there would be no way to 
attribute differences in outcomes for distance-learning vs. resident students to being a distance-
learning effect and not to other factors—even after controlling for what can be controlled for. 
 
In my career, I have ventured into the statistical side of other fields for DoD research besides 
manpower.  I have seen similar statistical problems.  But I am not familiar enough with the 
research to know whether the research in these fields suffers from similar pervasive problems as 
in manpower.  With regard to qualitative research (which can address the how and why), it is 
possible for bias and subjectivity to leak into any research.  But again I am not familiar enough 
with such research to understand how prevalent such problems are. 
 
With certain changes to practices and processes, there could be improvements in the quality of 
research and in how responsible the research is.  The DoD could then more efficiently disburse 
research funding in order to obtain a higher ratio of useful research to dollars spent, and the DoD 
could save money by not disbursing so much research funds that go towards invalid research — 
research that, due to inherent data or modeling problems, cannot provide any valid conclusions 
or useful information. 
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I will end this report with a set of policy recommendations that might help (albeit not 
completely) towards addressing the problems I highlighted.  These include the following, with 
more detail below: 
1. Require proper training of anyone conducting research for DoD.  This should include 
training on recognizing pitfalls and the ethics of research.  (From the evidence provided 
in this report, it seems that graduate schools did not do their job.) 
2. Provide basic training for DoD sponsors responsible for funding research on knowing 
what they can and cannot expect from researchers and some basic concepts of 
quantitative research so they know the right questions to ask. 
3. Change how proposed research gets approved and funded by using a review panel to 
ensure that a given study’s methods will produce valid and useful research before it is 
funded. 
4. Review incentives at organizations to ensure they promote high-quality research (vice 
other results that might work against that). 
5. Improve quality control at research organizations. 
6. Periodically review the quality of an organization’s research. 
 
 
Recommendation 1: Require training for researchers 
 
For anyone conducting statistical research for DoD (including for research organizations that do 
contract work for DoD), there should be mandatory training that covers important considerations.  
These include: 
• How to recognize the most relevant pitfalls. 
• Ethics training, which should include concepts such as: (a) statistical significance is not 
the goal of research; (b) how important it is to conduct honest research; (c) how 
important it is to disclose all potential pitfalls (i.e., alternative explanations for the 
results) that could not be ruled out; and (d) how to make responsible conclusions. 
 
We should not rely on graduate schools to train the researchers, as it has not worked to produce 
high-quality research.  If I had had such training when I began my career, I would have avoided 
many of the research mistakes that I made. 
 
 
Recommendation 2: Provide training for DoD sponsors 
 
Sponsors should have some training so they have a basic understanding of the pitfalls and 
limitations of research, perhaps similar to the ideas discussed in Sections 2, 3, and 4 above.  
They should also understand what they can reasonably expect from researchers: that the role of 
the researcher is to conduct honest and independent research, so there should be no expectation 
that the researcher have a certain result, and there should be no disappointment with the 
researcher based on the results.  This means that an insignificant estimate is okay, as is a result 
that is contrary to what the sponsor might have hoped for.  (I have not observed sponsors act in 
this fashion, but I have heard researchers in my career talk about wanting results that please the 
sponsor.) 
 




Recommendation 3: Change how research gets funded 
 
The National Institute of Health (NIH) has review boards meet to review all research proposals.  
Proposals get scored based on the importance of the topic, how valid the proposed research 
methods appear to be (including making sure the sample size would be adequate) and the quality 
of the researchers.  The latter is difficult to ascertain and involves a large amount of subjectivity, 
but it is often based on the research record of the researchers. This independent review is what 
determines which proposed projects get funded. 
 
I would recommend some simplified yet robust version of what NIH does.  There should be 
some review of proposals (by qualified people) based on the validity of the methods, whether 
certain potential pitfalls can be reasonably addressed, whether the end product should be 
credible, and the quality of the researchers.  The ability of researchers to be awarded future 




Recommendation 4: Review incentives at organizations to ensure they promote high-quality 
research 
 
Some policies at research organizations potentially incentivize unethical or irresponsible 
research.  At RAND, the key to getting promoted has been becoming widely known, receiving 
publicity, and getting your results widely disseminated.  At NPS, at tenure and promotion 
meetings within my department, I have seen hardly any discussion on the quality of research, but 
rather what has mattered has been a count of the publications and success in raising research 
money.  Any discussion on the quality of research has only been judged with respect to journal 
quality and not by any assessment of how responsible any sponsored (or other) research was 
conducted.  In fact, once when someone tried to discuss how one tenure candidate had several 
articles that were of questionable validity and forthrightness, the discussion was quickly shut 
down by those in power.  This is an example of how research organizations might not be doing 
what they should to ensure that honest and responsible research is being conducted for DoD.   
 
These factors for success at research organizations (getting known and getting funding) do not 
necessarily go hand-in-hand with producing high-quality research.  People can p-hack – as  
discussed in Section 2, this involves changing the model to find something interesting.  
Researchers can gloss over or just neglect to mention important pitfalls or alternative 
explanations to the results.  These practices can make their research more likely to be published, 
and the practices can be used to make research more interesting to research sponsors or to the 
general public. 
 
Because of such incentives, organizations should review how researchers (or professors) are 
judged.  For the sake of DoD research quality, organizations should make sure that honest and 
high-quality research is the main consideration.  And, this would be more consistent with how 
academic institutions gauge professors for promotion and tenure.  It just requires a little more 
work by these organizations to truly assess researchers and professors. 




There could be perverse incentives at the corporate level as well.  It seems that all organizations 
attempt to grow, and growth requires being able to generate additional business.  That is when 
researchers become more sales-people than academics.  And, my general observation has been 
that quality suffers when a research organization grows.  Any organization should have the right 
to pursue growth, but it should not come with the sacrifice of quality. 
 
 
Recommendation 5: Improve quality control at research organizations 
 
Projects should have an internal and/or external reviewer.  This needs to be done carefully, as 
some of the flawed research described here was done at organizations with peer review.  The 
reviewers should have the proper training that researchers should obtain (see Recommendation 
1).  Furthermore, the peer reviews that I have seen are not always as independent as would be 
ideal.  Thus, research organizations should put a review process in place that encourages 
thorough and honest reviews, as if the reviewers were refereeing a journal article.  This might 
require a change in culture, as outside reviewers who are tough on the research, in the present 
culture, might not be asked to review another report.  Or, internal reviewers who might be 
subject to promotion decisions by the authors of a report might be skittish about giving a tough 
review.  Therefore, the ideal reviewers would be external to the organization and paid by DoD so 
there would be less incentive to do anything less than a thorough critique. Such reviews of the 
research could be used for reviewing the quality of researchers. 
 
 
Recommendation 6: Periodically review the quality of an organization’s research 
 
This goes back to the first paragraph of the report in how companies that produce faulty systems 
are eventually denied contracts, but that there is no equivalent evaluations of companies on the 
validity of their research.  I would recommend that some process be implemented that has a 
periodic review of the research quality of FFRDC’s and other recipients of DoD research 
funding.  This could be for an organization as a whole as well as for specific divisions or areas 
within large research organizations. 
 
This could be integrated with recommendations 3, 4, and 5.  Any objective external reviews of 
research could be part of the review process for an organization.  And an organization’s review 
could be a factor in future research funding. 
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